Emerging market multinationals and internalisation theory by Casson, Mark & Wadeson, Nigel
Emerging market multinationals and 
internalisation theory 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution­Noncommercial­No Derivative Works 4.0 
Casson, M. and Wadeson, N. (2018) Emerging market 
multinationals and internalisation theory. International 
Business Review, 27 (6). pp. 1150­1160. ISSN 0969­5931 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2018.04.006 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/76911/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2018.04.006 
Publisher: Elsevier 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
1 
 
 
Emerging Market Multinationals and Internalisation Theory 
 
Abstract 
There is ongoing debate about the applicability of internalisation theory to Emerging Market 
Multinationals (EMNEs). Internalisation theory normally describes multinationals exploiting 
superior knowledge directly abroad rather than licensing its use to foreign firms. We argue that 
EMNEs can be explained readily in terms of internalisation theory. This involves 
internalisation in the opposite direction: knowledge is internalised by EMNEs which then 
exploit it utilising home-country cost advantages. However, this is normally achieved by means 
that avoid the licensing of key technologies from leading firms. This clarifies the theoretical 
basis of EMNE strategic asset seeking investment. Market-seeking investments are also linked 
to technology-seeking investments through fixed costs. A model formalises the arguments, 
establishing conditions leading to different types of equilibria when an advanced-economy firm 
competes with an emerging-economy firm. The range of factors that it incorporates means that 
it is also compatible with other theories of the EMNE. 
 
Keywords: Internalization, Emerging Economy, Multinational, Technology, R&D, Foreign 
Direct Investment, Firm. 
 
Funding: This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the 
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2 
 
Emerging Market Multinationals and Internalisation Theory 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Controversy remains over the applicability of internalisation theory, and of theories of 
international business more generally, to EMNEs regarding whether existing theories need to 
be amended or whether new theories are needed (Mathews, 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; 
Ramamerti, 2012; Verbeke and Kano, 2015). The traditional approach originally sought to 
explain developed-country MNEs. The assumption was that it was leading firms that would 
become MNEs, internalising the exploitation of their knowledge abroad due to market failure 
in knowledge markets. Such internalisation by leading firms should then be all the more 
likely in emerging economies where intellectual property rights are weak. EMNEs have been 
heavily engaged in FDI in recent times (Pillania, 2009), including technology-seeking FDI. 
However, they do not match the traditional picture of the MNE as an advanced firm with 
leading technologies and expertise. Rather, they are more likely to have mid-level 
technologies. Some have claimed that EMNEs actually do have significant firm-specific 
advantages so that traditional theory still holds as an explanation of their FDI. However, these 
advantages are seen as being of a different nature to those of advanced-economy MNEs 
(Ramamurti, 2009, 2012; Verbeke and Kano, 2015). They include, for instance, 
understanding of emerging-economy consumers, labour intensive production methods, 
competencies in operating in difficult institutional environments, and products that are cheap, 
basic, and rugged.  
Dunning described EMNE FDI in terms of strategic asset seeking FDI (Dunning and Narula, 
1995) and of ‘country specific ownership advantages’, giving Chinese firms’ access to ample 
financial assets as an example of the latter (Dunning, Kim, and Park, 2008). However, he saw 
such strategic asset seeking investment as augmenting existing ownership advantages. Narula 
(2012) argued that a threshold level of firm-specific assets is necessary before international 
expansion can take place and that emerging-economy firms have been pushed into strategic 
asset seeking FDI in order to help them survive in their home markets. Hennart (2012) argued 
that Dunning’s OLI framework, which incorporates internalisation, has a basic flaw which 
limits its applicability to EMNEs. This is that it assumes that the location advantages of a 
country are freely available to all firms operating there. Hennart argued that location 
advantages are sometimes owned by particular firms, usually local ones. He claimed that 
many inputs are sold in imperfect markets in which their local owners have significant market 
power. This allows such local firms to make profits which can then be enhanced by 
undertaking intangible-seeking FDI in developed countries.  
Rugman and Nguyen (2014: 54-55) criticised the concept of strategic asset seeking FDI as 
being inconsistent with the OLI framework. They viewed Dunning as having made a 
theoretical mistake because strategic asset seeking FDI is inconsistent with theories of the 
EMNE based on firms developing ownership advantages at home and then exploiting them 
abroad. They claimed that foreign firms would also be unlikely to be willing to sell advanced 
knowledge to emerging-economy firms. Buckley and Tian (2017) have argued that the debate 
on EMNEs has focussed on knowledge-based advantages and locational advantage and has 
failed to focus adequately on internalisation. It has therefore failed to coherently link 
internationalisation, strategic asset seeking, location, and profitability. We are therefore left 
with an unsatisfactory situation where the concept of strategic asset seeking investment has 
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been used to explain the existence of EMNEs but this has not been properly incorporated into 
theory (Meyer, 2015). Fundamental to this is a failure to explicitly recognise that the concept 
of internalisation does not preclude that it can occur in the opposite direction to that 
traditionally assumed under certain circumstances. Internalisation theory is in fact flexible in 
that it recognises that the outcome depends on the costs and benefits of any particular case. In 
contrast to the normal description of internalisation theory, where a firm may have an 
incentive to internalise the exploitation of its knowledge abroad, it is possible that a firm has 
incentives to internalise knowledge from abroad.  
Instead of the original owner of a technology exploiting it abroad through FDI, a firm 
domestic to the foreign country may instead internalise foreign knowledge. It will be argued 
below that there are incentives for this when the benefits of operating in a country are strong 
but there are high costs to foreign firms in taking advantage of them. This can allow an 
emerging-economy firm to be profitable in competition with advanced-economy firms 
despite employing inferior technology. Such conditions are present in emerging economies, 
as will be shown. The use of foreign knowledge by emerging-economy firms is then likely to 
be gained through means that avoid licensing by market-leading firms. It is necessary for the 
unit of analysis to be widened beyond that of the individual firm, to consider firms from 
different countries in competition, for the logic behind EMNEs to be properly understood. 
A model is presented below in order to help to resolve the question of why emerging-
economy firms can be profitable in competition with advanced-economy firms with superior 
technologies and the closely related issue of the logic for them undertaking technology-
seeking FDI. The particular variety of internalisation theory employed in the model has been 
termed by Casson (2018) as “internalisation plus”, and was introduced by Casson, Porter, and 
Wadeson (2016). Instead of taking the firm as the unit of analysis, it focuses on equilibrium 
outcomes of competition between the firms in an industry. To do this it employs game theory, 
which has developed substantially since internalisation theory was first introduced. The 
debate over the EMNE centres on its existence in competition with firms with superior 
technologies. There has therefore been difficulty in applying the logic of internalisation 
theory to the EMNE, including its technology-seeking FDI, because the dominant firm-
centred version of that logic involves firms with superior technologies being the ones that 
undertake FDI. We therefore argue that it is necessary to instead apply internalisation theory 
to competitive outcomes between firms. The internalisation plus approach is specifically 
designed to address such competitive outcomes using a game-theoretical approach. In the 
firm-centred approach, firms are seen as having given advantages. Many have viewed 
emerging-economy firms as tending to lack such advantages while some have argued that 
they have distinctive advantages, as explained above. In the internalisation plus approach the 
competitive outcome is endogenous. Any advantage that a firm has is partly a matter of the 
costs in the international business system, rather than being assumed to exist ex ante. A firm 
having a higher level of technology does not necessarily imply that it will win out in 
competition with a firm from another country.  
The contribution of the article is therefore to formally model equilibria of competition 
between an advanced-economy firm and an emerging-economy firm and to use the equilibria 
and logic of the model to make related arguments about the EMNE. The model involves a set 
of alternative Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium exists when neither firm has an incentive 
to change its plans, given the plans of the other firm. Under certain conditions the emerging-
economy firm becomes a multinational by engaging in FDI to the advanced economy. This 
can include technology-seeking FDI. The basis of the EMNE changes as the emerging 
economy becomes more open and developed. This is represented in the model in as much as 
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different sets of parameter values lead to different types of equilibria. Note that in some 
industries EMNEs have had little impact on advanced-economy markets. This can also be 
explained through the model through relevant equilibria and related parameter values. An 
example is the contrast between recent car assembly in China and its manufacture and export 
of car parts, as will be discussed later. The formal maths of the model is presented in the 
appendix. The basic underpinnings of the model are explained in the next section. Following 
this, the different alternative types of equilibria in the model are presented. Consideration is 
then given to how real-world conditions can lead the emerging-economy firm to become 
multinational. The impact of technology-seeking FDI on the equilibrium outcome is then 
discussed.  
 
2. THE MODEL: SOME BASICS 
 
2.1 Competition between Firms 
Internalisation theory goes beyond the individual firm centred focus of much international 
business theory (Buckley, 2016; Buckley and Hashai, 2004; Casson, Porter, and Wadeson, 
2016).  The model presented in this article (see Appendix) assumes an industry consisting of 
an advanced-economy firm and an emerging-economy firm. This is because the main 
question that is being addressed is how the emerging-economy firm can find it profitable to 
become a multinational in competition with advanced-economy firm(s) with superior 
technologies. The model follows the “internalisation plus” approach introduced in Casson, 
Porter, and Wadeson (2016), as explained above, but involves price competition between 
differentiated goods, rather than perfect substitutes. The degree of substitutability between 
the two products depends on the levels of both vertical and horizontal differentiation, where 
vertical differentiation refers to objective differences in the level of quality and horizontal 
differentiation refers to differences over which buyers will vary in their rankings. For 
instance, consumers will prefer a vehicle that breaks down less frequently but they will vary 
over which body style they prefer. Consumers will, however, differ in their willingness to pay 
for both improvements in vertical quality and for better matches between their preferences 
and horizontal product features, one key influence on this being differences in incomes. The 
model is also more focussed that the Casson, Porter, and Wadeson (2016) model, with an 
industry consisting of one firm in each of two countries, instead of possibly many firms 
across many countries. This allows a set of different types of equilibria to be considered in 
more detail. The model also adds the possibility of technology-seeking FDI and explicitly 
incorporates a choice over the level of labour intensity of production. 
The model involves a structure of costs within the international system, outcomes of 
competition between differentiated products, market sizes, and firm-specific factors. 
Proprietary technologies are assumed to require recurrent fixed R&D expenditures and so 
involve firm-level economies of scale. Because of the different factors involved, the model 
can be seen as synthesising different theories of the EMNE. It analyses the conditions that 
favour different equilibrium outcomes of competition between the advanced-economy firm 
and the emerging-economy firm. Each firm may or may not engage in internationalisation, 
may or may not close down, and if it does not close down then needs to decide its price in 
each of the markets that it serves. It is assumed that each firm can internationalise through 
exporting, FDI, or licensing. As the model is game theoretical, the equilibrium outcome for 
each firm depends also on the conditions facing the other firm. When the firms compete in a 
country’s market it is assumed that standard results of oligopoly theory apply in determining 
the equilibrium outcome (Mazzeo, 2002) in terms of the price and sales of each firm given 
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their products’ relative positions in the product space. So, for instance, if the two firms 
compete head-on with close substitutes then if one firm has a cost advantage it will capture 
the market. However, a higher cost firm may be able to achieve significant sales if it offers a 
more differentiated product, either in the form of higher quality or of one horizontally 
differentiated to better serve the preferences of some customers than its competitor’s product. 
In many cases more advanced technologies used by developed-country MNEs, combined 
with the cost disadvantages of foreign firms in exploiting their technologies in emerging 
economies, will result in products that are relatively expensive for the emerging economy 
aimed at the higher ends of its markets. They will sometimes be seen as status symbols by 
emerging-economy consumers, so increasing their willingness to pay price premiums (Kumar 
et al., 2009). Competition across the different countries’ markets is linked by fixed costs of 
R&D, helping to determine overall profitability and so whether a firm will continue in 
operation when faced with competition from the other firm. 
It should be noted that profitability is derived through demand conditions and the levels of 
costs in the international business system as well as through the technologies of the individual 
firms. A firm can potentially be profitable in both its home and foreign markets despite 
employing a technology that is technically inferior. Remember that the equilibrium outcome 
depends on the conditions faced by both firms. In other words, instead of the model being 
solved in terms of an individual firm making decisions faced with given conditions, the 
equilibrium outcome for either firm depends also on the responses its choices would generate 
from the other firm. For instance, entry into the foreign market might not be an equilibrium 
action if the firms’ products are close substitutes and the other firm has low enough costs to 
be able to react by substantially reducing its price. 
2.2 The Use of a Technology to Serve a Foreign Market 
A simplified cost structure for the exploitation of each firm’s technology in a foreign country 
is assumed, as illustrated in Figure 1. This is under the assumption, for simplicity, that the 
firm’s R&D is located in its home country. Note that, although each firm faces the same 
structure of different types of costs, the size of each cost is firm specific. The firm in the 
diagram is labelled as firm a. It is domestic to country A, the advanced-economy country. The 
foreign country for firm a is therefore country E, the emerging-economy country. The arrows 
in the diagram represent the “direction of force” of each cost. For instance, a high cost of firm 
a home-country production increases the relative attractiveness of locating production in 
country E and so the cost 𝑐𝑎 is shown above an arrow pointing away from its home country 
(A) towards the foreign country (E). 
FDI with production in the foreign country is split into two possibilities: one with 
subcontracting and one without. Ownership of both the product and the production facilities 
is achieved through FDI without subcontracting. Ownership of the product but not the 
production facilities is achieved by subcontracting production to a firm domestic to the 
foreign country while retaining responsibility for selling the product. Ownership of neither, 
while still exploiting the technology in the foreign market, is achieved by licensing. A further 
option for FDI, but with production in the home country, is to couple exporting with FDI into 
distribution. The model also includes the option for the advanced-economy firm to offshore 
production to the emerging-economy country in order to serve its home market. 
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Figure 1: Firm a’s Exploitation of its Technology in Country E 
Firm’s Home Country Foreign Country 
 
𝑐𝑎    Production cost in the firm’s home country 
𝑐𝐸    Production cost in the firm’s foreign country 
𝑡𝑎𝐸   Costs of international transfer of product 
𝑑𝑎𝐸
𝐴𝐿𝑇  Costs of arm’s length trade incurred in exporting to an independent foreign firm 
𝑑𝑎𝐸
𝐹𝑀 Foreign marketing costs incurred when distribution in a country is owned by a firm based in a 
different country 
𝑦𝑎𝐸   International technology transfer costs 
𝑐𝑎𝐸
𝐿    Licensing costs 
𝑞𝑎𝐸  Costs of quality control involved in subcontracting production 
𝑔𝑎𝐸  Governance costs involved in subcontracting production 
𝑑𝑎𝐸
𝐹𝑂  Political costs of foreign ownership in the foreign country 
 
Subcontracting involves costs of quality control and of governance (the latter consisting of 
other transaction costs involved in subcontracting). Costs of quality control depend both on 
the nature of the technology and on the availability of reputable subcontractors with good 
quality control procedures in the foreign country. FDI involves political costs of foreign 
ownership. Ownership of production and of distribution in the foreign country each incurs 
these costs. They include factors such as special controls, the risks of seizure of facilities or 
arbitrary taxation, and risks of future adverse policy changes with respect to foreign firms. 
Such costs tend to depend partly on the stage of development of the country concerned. 
However, it is one area where conditions can change quickly, such as where a different 
government comes into power. Ownership of distribution also incurs a cost of foreign 
marketing. 
Licensing costs involve costs related to bargaining, contract formation and enforcement, and 
market failure. Market failure is well-recognised for markets for knowledge and is at the 
heart of internalisation theory. The extent of the costs of market failure depend partly on the 
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quality of the system of intellectual property rights in the foreign country. These may vary 
significantly over time and are likely to tend to improve as the foreign country becomes more 
developed and economically open. Licensing costs may not only relate to those concerned 
with the emerging-economy market.  For instance, there is a risk that license infringement 
will involve global exporting by the infringing firm. 
FDI into production, subcontracting, and licensing all also involve costs of transferring 
technology to the foreign country. These have been eased to some extent by modern 
information technology and by cheap jet travel. However, they can still be high, particularly 
where the technology is beyond the existing expertise of recipients in the receiving country, 
so that they lack absorptive capacity. For example, engineers who are used to dealing with 
more basic technologies may struggle to understand an advanced technology. In such cases, 
there may need to be a more heavy involvement of home-country staff in foreign-country 
exploitation of the technology. The costs also depend on the degree of complexity and 
modularisation of the technology concerned. They will tend to be eased to some extent where 
the foreign country has higher levels of human capital, including emerging economies that 
have invested more heavily in education and training. In the diagram, production costs in the 
foreign country are represented as being equal, for simplicity, no matter whether production 
is by a licensee firm, a subcontractor firm, or firm a itself. Note, however, that in the model 
production costs are allowed to vary by each type of firm. 
Exporting involves both production costs in the home country and costs of international 
transfer of the product. Where there is FDI into distribution, it also involves a cost of foreign 
ownership and a cost of foreign marketing. Otherwise, it involves costs of arm’s length trade. 
In many cases these costs have changed significantly over time. Capital intensive production 
costs have reduced with increased automation, such as the use of computerised production 
machinery. Costs of transferring product abroad have been reduced by improvements in 
shipping technology (such as containerisation), information technology, and international 
agreements that have reduced state-imposed costs of trade. In the model, the level of labour 
intensity of production is partly determined by the relative costs of labour and capital. As 
emerging-economy countries have lower labour costs than advanced-economy countries, 
their production tends to be more labour intensive. The unit cost of production of each firm in 
each country depends on the countries’ labour costs, the firms’ costs of capital, and on the 
options for different levels of labour intensity given by available production technologies.  
3. OVERALL COMPETITIVE NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MODEL 
Given the market sizes and buyer preferences, the two firms compete based on the levels of 
costs that they each face and on their products’ positions in the product space. Note again that 
firm a is the advanced-economy firm and firm e is the emerging-economy firm. Country A is 
the advanced-economy country and country E is the emerging-economy country. Assume that 
barriers to trade and FDI between the two countries fall. Prior to this the two firms were 
profitable monopolies in their home markets. Now country A has low barriers to trade and 
FDI and an advanced system of intellectual property rights. However, country E may retain 
significantly higher barriers than country A and has a less-developed system of intellectual 
property rights. There are a number of possible alternative overall Nash equilibria in which 
neither firm has an incentive to change its course of action:  
1. Internationalisation of Firm e to Country A and with the Continuation of Firm a Selling 
only in its Home Market 
 
This equilibrium would be made more likely by a combination of the following factors: 
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Firm a continuing to sell only in its home market would be made more likely by high 
costs of firm a internationalisation into country E. In the model, this would involve 
all three of the alternative forms of internationalisation having high costs for firm a. 
These are exporting, licensing, and FDI. FDI has two variants in the model, one into 
both production and distribution and one into distribution only. The latter involves 
the subcontracting of production to a domestic firm. So high costs of subcontracting, 
such as where there is a lack of reliable subcontractors in the emerging-economy 
country, make it more likely that a strategy involving FDI will have high costs. 
The entry of firm e into the country A market would be encouraged by firm e having a 
production cost advantage, helping it to overcome costs of internationalisation. This 
can result from low labour costs in the emerging economy (as well as other low costs) 
combined with the use of labour-intensive production methods. Firm a is blocked 
from taking full advantage of low costs of production in country E by high costs of 
offshoring production there. 
The survival of firm a, despite the encroachment on its home market, would be made 
more likely by the two firms’ products not being close substitutes and by the country 
A market being large. For instance, the emerging-economy firm’s product may rely on 
less advanced technology and be seen as an inferior product so that it is restricted to 
the lower end of the market. Also, the larger the country A market, the more likely it 
is to be able to sustain firm a, given its fixed costs of R&D, even after some loss of 
market share and reduction in price resulting from the competition from firm e. 
 
2. Internationalisation of Firm e to Country A and with Exit of Firm a: 
The conditions favouring this equilibrium are similar to those for equilibrium 1 except for 
the following:  
A larger cost advantage will help firm e to be able to undercut the pricing of firm a. 
Price competition will also be more intense, so helping to force the exit of firm a, the 
closer the products of the two firms are as substitutes. Alternatively, if firm e’s 
product does not suit many country A buyers’ preferences then many may continue to 
buy from firm a even if its product is significantly more expensive. 
 
The exit of firm a would also be more likely the higher are the fixed costs of R&D 
and the smaller is the country A market. A small home market means that firm a’s 
average fixed costs of R&D will be high if selling only within it, particularly after 
losing some market share to firm e. Firm e, on the other hand, is already covering its 
fixed costs through sales in its home market, making it further able to undercut the 
pricing of firm a when selling in country A. 
 
3. Internationalisation of Firm a to Country E but with Firm e Continuing to Sell only in its 
Home Market  
 
This is similar to equilibrium 1 but with the positions of the two firms reversed. It is 
therefore favoured by the following conditions: 
 
The costs of internationalisation of firm a to country E must not be prohibitive 
relative to other factors. At least one of the three forms of internationalisation 
(exporting, licensing, and FDI) must be of low enough cost. For instance, there may 
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be a reliable subcontractor in country e or the country E authorities may be relatively 
welcoming to FDI from firm a. 
 
Firm e’s cost advantages in serving the country A and E markets must not be high 
enough for it to be able to substantially undercut the pricing of firm a to the point 
where firm a finds it unprofitable to serve either market. For example, cost 
advantages of firm e will be reduced if firm a can offshore production to country E at 
relatively low cost. Again, this would be favoured by the presence of a reliable 
subcontractor firm in country E or by a relative openness to FDI into country E by 
firm a. Additionally, there may be little cost advantage to producing in country E if 
automation technologies are available that mean that higher labour costs in country A 
are of far less significance. 
 
If firm e’s product is inferior then there may be little demand for it in country A. It 
may also be less well matched than firm a’s product to country A preferences 
regarding horizontal differentiation. At least some customers in country E will be 
willing to pay a price premium for a superior product, so helping to overcome any 
cost disadvantage faced by firm a in serving the country E market. 
 
Firm e is more likely to be able to survive if its home market is large enough to 
sustain it despite losing some market share given the level of its fixed costs of R&D 
and the effect of competition on pushing down its price. If firm e has a 
technologically inferior product then it may have relatively low fixed costs of R&D, 
giving it a greater chance of remaining profitable after losing some market share in its 
home market.  
 
4. Internationalisation of Firm a to Country E and with Firm e Exit 
This is a similar case to equilibrium 3 except that Firm e exit is brought about by one or 
more of the following factors: 
If firm a’s product has a significant vertical quality advantage then buyers will prefer 
it so long as it is not too expensive for them, so helping to reduce the viability of firm 
e. Firm e will also be more likely to exit if it faces large fixed costs of R&D and its 
home market is not large enough to give it large-scale sales after losing some market 
share to firm a. Note that there may be a significant price fall if the two firms compete 
in the country E market, partly because firm a is profitable based on its home market 
sales and so it does not have to cover its fixed costs of R&D in its pricing in country 
e. 
 
5. Bi-Directional Internationalisation 
This offers the advantages of choice and price competition to buyers in each country. It is 
favoured by the following factors:  
If neither firm has a substantial cost advantage in serving either market then this 
helps to ensure that neither is driven from either market. Costs of 
internationalisation must also be low enough so as not to block 
internationalisation by either firm, while the products must not be too close as 
substitutes which ensures that price competition is not so intense as to force the 
higher-cost producer out of business. In other words, any cost advantage of either 
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firm in supplying either market does not stop some buyers from purchasing from 
the more expensive firm in order to better match their preferences.  
The combined market size across the two countries must be large enough to 
sustain both firms, given their fixed costs of R&D, even though neither 
monopolises the market in either country. The higher each firm’s fixed costs of 
R&D, the more important it is that it is able to achieve high sales in competition 
with the other firm in order to achieve economies of scale. 
This equilibrium can exist early on in the emerging economy’s development. It is 
common for an emerging-economy firm to export a low-cost product aimed at the lower 
end of the advanced-economy market while the advanced-economy firm’s product may 
gain some sales in the high end of the emerging-economy market despite its high cost. 
The equilibrium will be likely, in practice, to change in nature as country E becomes 
relatively economically open and developed so long as fixed costs of R&D are not so 
high as to create a natural monopoly in the international (i.e. combined country A and E) 
market. This happens as the emerging-economy firm’s cost advantage recedes and so its 
sales rely increasingly on horizontal product differentiation rather than just on low price. 
If it has not already upgraded its product, this also puts pressure on the emerging-
economy firm to offer a product of comparable quality. It is possible that firm a will 
continue to dominate the upper end of the market if the fixed costs of R&D for an upper-
end product are high enough, though if the technology matures then the costs of R&D are 
likely to decline.  
6. No Internationalisation 
This is likely if there are high costs of internationalisation for both firms, the two firms’ 
products are close substitutes so that buyers are not willing to pay a significant price 
premium for either firm’s product, and neither firm has a strong production cost 
advantage. Additionally, it is also more likely if neither firm can achieve much in the way 
of economies of scale by entering its foreign market. Instead, average fixed costs of R&D 
are low for both firms based on sales in their home countries alone. This would result 
from a large market in each country and relatively low fixed costs of R&D.  
 
4. CONDITIONS LEADING TO AN EMERGING MARKET MULTINATIONAL 
An emerging-market multinational may come into existence in the model in equilibria 1, 2, 
and 5. The relevance of these can be illustrated through reference to some observations about 
the real world. First of all, emerging economies are known for production cost advantages 
based on cheap labour, among other factors, particularly while they are still earlier on in their 
processes of economic development. Note that the extent of such advantages for any specific 
type of product partly depends on available production technologies, as will be discussed 
below. Secondly, where the emerging-economy production cost advantages are combined 
with asymmetric costs of internationalisation which favour the emerging-economy firm, this 
can lead to it having cost advantages over the advanced-economy firm both in production and 
in serving its home market. This can lead to its internationalisation and to it becoming an 
EMNE. Note how these arguments are based around the costs in the international business 
system, and the positions of firms in competition with each other, in contrast to the 
traditionally dominant firm-centred approach in which the firm has given advantages. 
4.1 Production Cost Advantages in Emerging Economies 
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Advantages to producing in an emerging economy, rather than in a high-wage advanced 
economy, are generally pronounced in industries lacking in technologies allowing 
automation. Where automated, capital intensive production can be undertaken in advanced 
economies and this may largely or wholly cancel out the cost advantages of an emerging 
economy. This can be seen in the patterns of production in emerging economies. For 
instance, China is only one example of an emerging economy that has been a major 
assembler of electronics during its period of emergence. It is no coincidence that the 
assembly of electronics involves tasks that have been difficult to automate. For instance, 
traditional circuit board assembly involves the picking up of small components, their 
realignment, and their insertion through holes. However, in recent years, there has been 
increased automation, including greater use of surface mount technology (Wable, 2013). 
While China’s electronics industry has been building competencies and external economies 
of scale (Wang and Wu, 2016), future emerging economies may have to develop along 
different paths as increased automation will have reduced their cost advantages in significant 
parts of electronics manufacturing.  
Most Chinese-built cars, by contrast, are sold domestically with a low level of exports to 
advanced economies, though with some being exported to other emerging-economy markets. 
A large proportion of the great number of cars now produced in China are western products 
assembled in China for the domestic market in joint ventures with state-owned enterprises. 
Such joint ventures have been required by the Chinese government. This is akin to 
equilibrium 3, but with quasi-integration in the form of joint ventures rather than 
subcontracting to independent firms. Modern car plants can be highly automated and are fed 
by global supply chains. This helps to explain why China has so far largely failed to export 
cars to advanced-economy markets but nonetheless has substantial exports of car components 
(Li, Kong, and Zhang, 2016). This is in contrast to the paths followed by past Asian 
emerging-economy car industries when car plants were less automated and when 
international trade in car parts was more limited. For instance, Japanese firms were initially 
able to break into western markets in the 1950s with cheap but relatively low-quality products 
(Kumar and Steenkamp, 2013: 25), exploiting Japan’s labour and capital cost advantages at 
the time.  
4.2 Asymmetric Costs of Internationalisation 
As noted above, production cost advantages in emerging economies, when combined with 
significant barriers to advanced-economy firms internationalising to them, are important in 
the model in helping to lead to equilibria 1 and 2 and to the existence of the EMNE. This can 
also be the case for equilibrium 5, particularly earlier on in the emerging economy’s process 
of economic development, when the emerging-economy firm may specialise in a low-cost, 
low-end product. However, equilibrium 5 can also result from competition based more on 
horizontal product differentiation. It is a matter of observation that there tend to be significant 
barriers to the internationalisation of advanced-economy firms into emerging economies, 
restricting access to their low production costs in relevant industries and also to their markets. 
For instance, China had a value of 0.627 in the OECD Total FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness 
Index in 1997 that dropped to 0.327 by 2016. The OECD averages, by contrast were 0.127 
and 0.067 respectively. Countries with high scores in the index tend to have significantly 
lower stocks of FDI relative to GDP compared to those with low scores. Clearly, China 
retains significant barriers to inward FDI, though these have been falling in strength 
according to this index. However, there is evidence that some elements of political costs have 
risen in emerging economies (Henisz and Zelner, 2010). One alternative form of 
internationalisation to FDI into production is to instead subcontract production to a local firm 
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and have FDI only into distribution. However, this can require fairly extensive quality control 
and contractual governance costs when there is a lack of available high-quality, reputable 
subcontractors. FDI without subcontracting exposes the foreign firm additionally to higher 
costs due to political risks. These risks are particularly strong where production is capital 
intensive. The evolving situation in Russia from the early days after the fall of the Soviet 
Union is an example of the political risks of FDI (Gans-Morse, 2012), in this case involving 
international sanctions as well as domestic risks. The foreign marketing costs involved with 
FDI can also be high where a foreign firm is unfamiliar with the emerging-economy market. 
The failed entry of Ebay into China is an example of this. For instance, Ebay’s site failed to 
facilitate real-time communications between buyers and sellers. This was important due to 
the stress placed on the building of trust in Chinese culture (Yang and Wang, 2013). 
Production in the emerging-economy country also incurs technology transfer costs for the 
advanced-economy firm which are likely to be more significant the more complex, leading-
edge and firm-specific the technology. These costs will tend to be lower than they would be 
for less-developed countries, however, where emerging-economy countries have invested 
heavily in human capital. 
There are also the alternatives to FDI of licensing and of exporting. In an emerging economy, 
licensing can be a costly option. For instance, there was relatively little protection of 
intellectual property rights in China historically but this started to change following the turn 
of the millennium (Holgersson, 2015). Exporting can also be costly. Data for tariff rates 
applied to imports tells a similar story to inward FDI with China having had an unweighted 
average rate of 16.7% (World Bank: Average MFN Applied Tariff Rates) in 1997 that had 
dropped to 7.9% by 2010. This is in contrast to values of 3.8% and 2.8% respectively for 
high-income OECD. Again, China had significantly higher tariff rates which declined 
significantly. Each one of the alternatives available to the advanced-economy multinational to 
exploit cheap production conditions in the emerging economy, whether through FDI, 
subcontracting, or licensing will therefore tend to be costly. Exporting to the emerging 
economy will also normally be costly, so reducing the incentives for FDI into distribution 
only. 
Where there is a combination of low production costs in emerging economies and barriers 
involved in foreign firms taking advantage of them, this gives emerging-economy firms a 
significant cost advantage over advanced-economy firms. This home-country cost advantage 
is not firm specific, as it arises from being native to the emerging economy rather than factors 
specific to the individual firm. However, the greater the value of the capabilities and assets of 
the emerging-economy firm, the better placed it will be overall. One past exception was 
Singapore which remained open to foreign firms with the result that it is a notable case where 
foreign multinationals heavily engaged in labour-intensive manufacturing for export (Lim, 
1983) rather than the economy being more focussed on domestic firms. In contrast, South 
Korea was similarly heavily reliant on labour-intensive manufacturing of exports during its 
economic emergence but relied on large domestic conglomerates (Kim et al., 2004) rather 
than foreign multinationals. FDI by these firms ballooned in the 1980s when government 
restrictions were relaxed (Lee, 2010).  
4.3 Further examples of specific equilibria relevant to the EMNE 
When Japanese car firms came to have large-scale sales in western markets, many western 
consumers nonetheless remained faithful to western brands. It was therefore a case close in 
nature to the model’s equilibrium 1. Alternatively, in the model it is quite likely that 
equilibrium 2 will result, with firm e internationalisation leading to firm a exit, if the firms’ 
products are instead close substitutes, assuming also that firm e has a significant production 
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cost advantage and faces relatively low costs of internationalisation to the advanced 
economy. For instance, some advanced-economy steel firms have only survived competition 
from Chinese producers because of special trade barriers put in place to protect them. 
Chinese manufacturers have benefitted both from cheap labour and cheap power produced by 
polluting coal-fired power plants while advanced-economy firms have faced power costs 
inflated by their governments’ green policies. 
Equilibrium 5 is more likely in the model if the products are not close substitutes, so that 
consumers value the choice between them, there is sufficient demand across the two 
economies to sustain both firms, and the emerging-economy firm does not have too great a 
cost advantage. This includes cases where the emerging-economy firm’s product is lower end 
but competes based on cheapness.  With smartphones, for instance, we see two-way 
internationalisation with Chinese phones selling in advanced-economy markets and 
advanced-economy firms’ phones, such as Apple’s iPhone, selling in China. Apple has a 
global supply chain, including subcontracted Chinese assembly, so helping it to compete with 
Chinese firms even though they now also offer higher-end products. Despite the increased 
global competition, there are advanced-economy firms that continue to be highly profitable. 
The success of Chinese firms has been partly facilitated by their large home market, as noted 
below. 
While advanced economies are generally relatively open to both trade and inward FDI, the 
emerging-economy firm is at a disadvantage in terms of foreign marketing costs in serving 
their markets. However, foreign marketing costs can be reduced by FDI in the form of 
purchases of foreign firms involved in distribution, so internalising their market expertise and 
brands within the boundaries of the emerging-economy firm. Both technology-seeking FDI, 
as will now be considered, and market-seeking FDI can therefore result in the emerging-
economy firm becoming multinational. 
5. CHANGING THE EQUILIBRIUM THROUGH TECHNOLOGY-SEEKING 
INVESTMENT 
Recall that some internalisation theorists have previously argued against the importance of 
emerging-economy firms purchasing technologies from advanced-economy firms (Rugman 
and Nguyen, 2014: 54-55), claiming that leading firms will generally not be willing to sell 
them. However, it will now be argued that there are means for an emerging-economy firm to 
buy technologies that do not involve purchases from highly-profitable operations. It may 
instead gain technologies through alternative means such as buying an advanced-economy 
firm (Luo and Tung, 2007: 487-8), purchasing technologies that are of relatively low value to 
their original owners, or taking an organic approach such as setting up R&D facilities located 
in foreign clusters. The opportunity to follow either of the first two approaches is more likely 
to exist when competition within the global industry has resulted in some firms being 
relatively unsuccessful with the particular type of product concerned. For instance, IBM’s PC 
division was making significant losses when it was sold to Lenovo. Technologies can have 
more value to the emerging-economy firm exploiting cost advantages, including superior 
access to its home market, than to their original owners. This tallies with the observation that 
EMNEs sometimes acquire advanced-economy firms that are owners of tired and dated 
brands (Buckley, 2009: 140). They have also bought patents from firms that are withdrawing 
from their related operations. Whichever mode is used, the purchasing firm needs the 
required absorptive capacity if it is to affect an international transfer of knowledge (Zheng et 
al., 2016). So, while leading firms are unlikely to be willing to either sell or licence their key 
technologies to emerging-economy firms, due to costs of market failure, this does not mean 
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that there are not still opportunities for emerging-economy firms to invest in acquiring 
technologies from abroad.  
Once a rationale for the survival and profitability of an emerging-economy firm in 
competition with an advanced-economy firm has been established, it can therefore be seen as 
being natural that, under the right circumstances, it will reach out to obtain more advanced 
foreign technologies. Firms will often, in reality, grow and expand their technological base 
both organically and inorganically (Deng, 2009; Sun, 2009). The purchase of foreign firms 
can be used to buy both technology and better market access. One motivation for both 
technology and market-seeking investments is that they can be used to spread the fixed costs 
of R&D more widely. If technology is bought then it can be applied in the purchasing firm’s 
home market as well as in the markets where it is already exploited. The purchase of a 
foreign firm, purchase of patents, or investment in foreign-located R&D activities allows the 
EMNE to apply its home-country cost advantages and firm-specific advantages to more 
sophisticated and higher-end products and to improve its production quality and efficiency. 
Note that it is not necessary for the EMNE to match a leading advanced-economy firm’s level 
of technology. Any improvement in its technology may improve its competitive position. 
As can be seen from the model, if the emerging-economy firm has a product based on weak 
technology and seen as inferior then, if it does not have a strong cost advantage, it risks 
losing market share at home and having only limited success in the advanced-economy 
market. This situation is more likely if wages in its home country have already risen as its 
economy has become more developed and open, such that its cost advantage is reduced and 
its home market consumers can afford to be more discerning. However, if it competes with 
both an upgraded technology and a cost advantage then it may have a strong position. 
Utilising more advanced technologies increases recurrent fixed costs of R&D and so provides 
a further impetus for market-seeking internationalisation. Market-seeking and technology-
seeking FDI are therefore linked. 
In some cases an investment in technology would shift the overall equilibrium between the 
six cases above. It could allow the emerging-economy firm to enter the advanced-economy 
market and, if it then had a cost advantage and a similar product, force the advanced-
economy firm to exit the industry. In some cases the investment would be necessary to 
prevent the exit of the emerging-economy firm itself, such as where its cost advantages have 
receded as the emerging economy has become more open. Lenovo is a well-known example 
of a firm forced to internationalise by increased competition in its home market. This led to 
the purchase of IBM’s personal computer division, giving access both to technology and a 
significant market position (Holtbrugge and Kreppel, 2012: 22). The threat posed by changes 
in the home market may lead EMNEs to conduct FDI in developed countries in ways that 
give them more rapid access to markets and technologies. The purchase of a foreign firm can 
be a means of short-cutting the process of upgrading sophistication and quality, and of 
building brands and market penetration. This is in contrast to the more traditional so-called 
Asian Tortoise strategy followed in the past by firms such as Toyota and Samsung (Kumar 
and Steenkamp, 2013) which involves entering low-price niche markets and then making 
gradual improvements in quality and movements to higher price levels. It can be argued that 
emerging-economy firms have less time to make such improvements nowadays due to the 
more open international system. They may often follow the same process of beginning by 
competing on cost and then upgrading their products but in an accelerated fashion. This can 
be seen, for instance with Chinese smartphones which have moved rapidly from lower-price, 
lower-end products to a fuller range, including premium phones offered by firms such as 
Lenovo and Huawei. The success of Chinese firms has been partly based on a large home 
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market for lower-cost low and mid-range phones. A degree of technology maturation, leading 
to the standardisation of technologies, has helped to facilitate the Chinese firms’ technology 
catch up. The extent of technological advantage of advanced-economy firms like Apple and 
Samsung has been reduced, though they retain strong positions. 
The advanced-economy firm could also invest in additional R&D in order to create a variant 
of its product specifically aimed at the emerging-economy market. If offshoring production, it 
could also redesign its product and production technologies in order to facilitate the use of 
more labour-intensive production methods, incurring further costs of R&D. Again, such 
changes could shift the overall equilibrium. It could potentially make entry into the emerging-
economy country worthwhile and could force the exit of the emerging-economy firm, 
particularly if the advanced-economy firm can offer higher quality without a large price 
premium. Eventually, rises in the costs of production in an emerging economy, and perhaps 
an increase in the availability of automation technologies within the industry, will undermine 
domestic firms’ cost advantages. By then the emerging economy may have firms with 
significant resource-based advantages and may have built up a strong industrial cluster, 
making bi-directional internationalisation based more on horizontal differentiation more 
likely. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Those used to traditional descriptions of internalisation in international business theory would 
have expected the more technologically advanced firms from developed countries to invest 
heavily in emerging economies. However, they would not have expected emerging-economy 
firms to carry out substantial amounts of FDI, as has also happened. Researchers have been 
left pondering why firms that seemingly lack strong firm-specific advantages have carried out 
FDI. However, the links between internalisation theory, strategic asset seeking, and EMNEs 
have been left unclear. 
A formal model, based on the “internalisation plus” approach, has been provided in this 
article to help to explain the existence of the EMNE. It involves price competition between 
both vertically and horizontally differentiated products. Using the logic of the model, it has 
been argued that an emerging-economy firm can be profitable in competition with an 
advanced-economy firm based on home-country cost advantages in both production and in 
exploiting the home market. These cost advantages for home firms are the result of a 
combination of high costs of licensing, FDI, exporting, and subcontracting into the emerging 
economy. This can then lead the emerging-economy firm to undertake both technology-
seeking FDI and FDI into distribution, so that it becomes an EMNE. Technology-seeking 
FDI by the EMNE is likely to take a form that avoids licensing from a leading firm. Price 
competition is most intense where products are close substitutes. Fixed costs of R&D can be 
spread by selling products initially in the lower ends of advanced-economy markets as well as 
in a large home market. This allows low-cost EMNEs to be profitable despite lacking 
significant firm-specific advantages. However, they may then make technology-seeking 
investments which then lead them to compete more directly higher up in advanced-economy 
markets while still exploiting home-country cost advantages.  
Dynamic effects, involving shifts between equilibria, that result from an emerging economy 
going through a process of opening up and foreign firms taking time to fully penetrate its 
markets can also be considered. Domestic firms that may have had fairly heavy protection 
from foreign and domestic competition find it falling away. If they are using inferior 
technologies then they may have to upgrade fairly quickly in order to protect market share in 
their home markets and even to survive. Domestic production costs will also tend to increase 
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as the home economy becomes more developed. If economies of scale are significant, such as 
due to large fixed costs of R&D, a domestic firm may be in danger of becoming unviable as it 
loses market share in its home market, and so may have to undertake market-seeking FDI. 
Additionally, economies of scale may well increase significantly due to the need to utilise 
more advanced technologies which involve larger fixed costs of R&D, so further driving 
market-seeking internationalisation. There is therefore not only potential profit from 
internationalising but there can also be an imperative to undertake it for survival.  
EMNEs have advantages in labour intensive production methods and in cheap and rugged 
products. This is in contrast to the more capital intensive methods of production and more 
sophisticated products that are typical of many advanced-economy MNEs. The analysis in 
this article does not assume that competitive advantage exists independently. Rather, the 
commercial advantage of a technology in a country depends partly on the costs in the 
international business system. A technically inferior product can be commercially viable as 
can FDI to obtain technologies that are not as advanced as those used by leading firms. 
Similarly, a firm with a technically superior product can be unprofitable. As EMNEs upgrade 
their technologies and as their home economies become more open and developed, there may 
be two-way internationalisation based more fully on product differentiation than on the cost 
advantages of EMNEs. However, emerging-economy firms that have not upgraded 
themselves sufficiently are likely to fail when subjected to greater competitive pressures. 
Country-specific factors can play an important role. For instance, an EMNE operating in an 
emerging economy that has invested relatively heavily in human capital may face lower costs 
of international technology transfer. Market sizes in different countries are also important as 
firms need to spread fixed costs. The various basic forms of equilibrium are formally 
represented in the model and associated with different sets of parameter values.  
The most obvious limitations of the model relate to its simplifying assumptions which were 
chosen to reflect the particular focus of this article. Firstly, the model assumes only two 
countries, with one firm headquartered in each country. So, for instance, a real-world firm 
will be in a better position to internationalise in reality if it is in a strong position relative to 
any domestic competitors. It will also be better able to spread fixed costs if it sells in further 
countries, such as EMNEs selling in developing countries. The model also assumes that each 
firm competes with only a single product. This therefore precludes a product proliferation 
strategy which could be used to reduce demand for a foreign firm’s products. However, this 
would be relatively ineffective against an EMNE exploiting cost advantages that allowed it to 
undercut an advanced-economy firm with a lower-end product. It would also be less effective 
against a foreign firm able to cover a significant part of its fixed costs through a large home 
market. 
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APPENDIX 
Take a simple case for ease of exposition. Note that the results are nonetheless intended to be 
representative of factors that would also affect cases with larger numbers of firms and countries. 
Assume that there are 2 countries and 2 firms. There is an advanced-economy country (A) and an 
emerging-economy country (E). Country A has NA consumers and country E has NE consumers, each 
buying 1 unit of the good concerned per period. Initially, there is a monopoly, firm e, in country E 
selling only in its home market. There is also a monopoly, firm a, in country A. Each firm sells an 
existing product, these being differentiated versions of the same general type of product. Assume that 
the authorities do not allow either of the two firms to buy the other.  
Assume that each firm is profitable initially and that international trade and FDI between the two 
countries are blocked. The initial prices of firm e in country E and of firm a in country A are pe and pa 
respectively. Recurrent R&D costs are re1 and ra1, expressed as per period equivalent amounts. The 
quantities of labour and capital per unit of output, le and ke, which are treated as constant in relation to 
output for simplicity, are determined by the relevant production technology and by the relative costs 
of capital and labour. WE is the cost per unit of labour in country E and Ke is the cost per unit of 
capital, where this depends both on the type of physical capital involved and the cost of financial 
capital faced by firm e. The function fe represents current production technologies for firm e’s 
product. 
{𝑙𝑒 , 𝑘𝑒} = 𝑓𝑒(𝑊𝐸 , 𝐾𝑒)          (1) 
This minimises the constant marginal cost which is then: 
𝑐𝑒 = 𝑙𝑒𝑊𝐸 + 𝑘𝑒𝐾𝑒          (2) 
The initial profits of firm e (πe>0) are therefore: 
𝜋𝑒 = 𝑁𝐸(𝑝𝑒 − 𝑐𝑒) − 𝑟𝑒1         (3) 
The initial profits of firm a in country A (πa>0) are: 
𝜋𝑎 = 𝑁𝐴(𝑝𝑎 − 𝑐𝑎) − 𝑟𝑎1         (4) 
Where 𝑐𝑎is minimised through: 
{𝑙𝑎 , 𝑘𝑎} = 𝑓𝑎(𝑊𝐴, 𝐾𝑎)          (5) 
Where: 
𝑐𝑎 = 𝑙𝑎𝑊𝐴 + 𝑘𝑎𝐾𝑎          (6) 
Now assume that barriers to trade and FDI fall. Country A now has low barriers and an advanced 
system of intellectual property rights. However, country E may retain significantly higher barriers 
than country A and has a less-developed system of intellectual property rights. Consider the resulting 
incentives for internationalisation. 
There is a need to allow for the possibility that firm a will now offshore at least some stage of 
production in country E for sales in its home country in order to take advantage of lower production 
costs. For instance, this might involve assembly, particularly if it does not involve a great deal of 
knowledge specific to firm a. This could be achieved through a relationship with a third firm. Assume 
that firm is a subcontractor based in country E. In its relationship with the subcontractor, firm a incurs 
costs of ensuring adequate quality control (qaE) and governance costs (gaE). There are also costs of 
transferring firm a’s product internationally to country A, taA, and costs of technology transfer, 𝑦𝑎𝐸. 
The saving in the constant unit production cost from using the subcontractor is 𝑐𝑎 − 𝑐𝑠𝐸(𝑊𝐸 , 𝐾𝑠𝐸).  
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Alternatively, the offshoring of production could be achieved through the use of FDI by firm a into 
production in country E. This involves costs of transferring goods internationally from country E to 
country A and costs of technology transfer. It also involves a cost of foreign ownership, 𝑑𝑎𝐸
𝐹𝑂. So the 
overall unit cost saving, m, is: 
𝑚 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[0, 𝑐𝑎 − 𝑐𝑠𝐸(𝑊𝐸 , 𝐾𝑠𝐸) − 𝑞𝑎𝐸 − 𝑔𝑎𝐸 − 𝑡𝑎𝐴 − 𝑦𝑎𝐸 , 𝑐𝑎  − 𝑐𝑎𝐸(𝑊𝐸 , 𝐾𝑎) − 𝑑𝑎𝐸
𝐹𝑂 − 𝑡𝑎𝐴 − 𝑦𝑎𝐸  ] 
            (7) 
Internationalisation Decisions in Each Direction 
Firm e to Country A 
The choice of mode of internationalisation is made to minimise the associated costs, which are 
assumed to be variable with output (while R&D costs are fixed costs). Marginal cost is represented by 
c. This is superscripted to show the mode of internationalisation and subscripted to show the firm and 
the host country. For now consider any given value of firm e sales in country A, 𝑁𝐴𝑠𝑒𝐴, as associated 
with any given pair of prices following internationalisation or with firm a exiting the industry.  
The constant marginal cost is determined as the minimum of that associated with exporting (trade), 
FDI with production in the foreign country, or licensing. 
𝑐𝑒𝐴 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛[𝑐𝑒𝐴
𝑇 , 𝑐𝑒𝐴
𝐹𝐷𝐼 , 𝑐𝑒𝐴
𝐿 ]           (8) 
Assume that FDI with production in the foreign country can be into both production and distribution 
or into distribution only. The latter is accompanied by the subcontracting of production in country A. 
The cost 𝑐𝑒𝐴
𝐹𝐷𝐼is the lower of the costs of these two options: 
𝑐𝑒𝐴
𝐹𝐷𝐼= 𝑀𝑖𝑛[𝑐𝑒𝐴(𝑊𝐴, 𝐾𝑒) + 𝑑𝑒𝐴
𝐹𝑂 ,  𝑐𝑠𝐴(𝑊𝐴, 𝐾𝑠𝐴) + 𝑞𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝑒𝐴] +  𝑑𝑒𝐴
𝐹𝑂 + 𝑑𝑒𝐴
𝐹𝑀 + 𝑦𝑒𝐴  (9) 
Note that licensing and FDI into production both fail to take advantage of lower production costs in 
country E.  However, they avoid the costs of international trade. Licensing also utilises the licensee’s 
knowledge of its home market, avoiding costs of foreign marketing, but involves potential market 
failure, particularly if intellectual property rights are weak and difficult to enforce. However, the 
emerging-economy firm’s product is most likely to be of medium-level technology so that there may 
be little demand from potential licensees in country A where superior technologies are available. 
Exporting, with or without FDI into distribution, is therefore likely to be the better choice for firm e in 
order to exploit low production costs in its home country. This involves costs of home country 
production and of transferring the product to country A and either costs of arm’s length trade or costs 
of foreign ownership plus costs of foreign marketing: 
𝑐𝑒𝐴
𝑇 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛[𝑑𝑒𝐴
𝐴𝐿𝑇 , 𝑑𝑒𝐴
𝐹𝑂 + 𝑑𝑒𝐴
𝐹𝑀] + 𝑐𝑒 + 𝑡𝑒𝐴       (10) 
If the costs of foreign ownership in country A are low and the costs of foreign marketing can be 
reduced by purchasing a country A firm involved in distribution, both reflecting country A’s economic 
openness, then FDI into distribution is likely so long as firm e wishes to build its brand in country A 
rather than simply supplying a low price, inferior or commoditised product. 
The loss of profits of firm a resulting from the incursion into its home market, if it were to continue in 
operation, where the price of firm a following the incursion is 𝑝𝑎
′ , is: 
𝑞𝑎 = 𝑁𝐴𝑠𝑒𝐴(𝑝𝑎 − 𝑐𝑎) + 𝑁𝐴(1 − 𝑠𝑒𝐴)(𝑝𝑎 − 𝑝𝑎
′ ) − 𝑚𝑁𝐴(1 − 𝑠𝑒𝐴)    (11) 
Note that qa incorporates any saving that firm a can make by sourcing at least some part of its 
production for its home market in country E. 
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𝑥𝑎 represents the closure decision of firm a following the incursion into its market, given firm e’s 
choice of exporting, FDI, or licensing. Note that 𝑣𝑎𝐸is the value for firm a of internationalising to 
country E, as defined below. 
𝑥𝑎 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝐴 = 1 if 𝜋𝑎 − 𝑞𝑎 + 𝑀𝑎𝑥[0, 𝑣𝑎𝐸] < 0; 𝑥𝑎 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝐴 < 1 otherwise  (12) 
Closure is more likely if the two firms’ products are close substitutes and if firm e has a cost 
advantage. However, firm e’s product may well be less sophisticated and of lower quality early on in 
country E’s process of emergence. In this case the products will not be close substitutes, though this 
may change with time.  
The price of each firm in country A is set relative to the price of the other firm and taking into account 
its own costs and also the relative market positioning of the two firms’ products. Assume that each 
firm takes the price of the other firm as a given when setting its own price. 
Firm e’s price and output levels for a given price of firm a: 
{𝑝𝑒𝐴, 𝑠𝑒𝐴} = 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑐𝑒𝐴, 𝑧, 𝑝𝑎
′ , 𝑥𝑎)        (13) 
Firm a’s price and output levels for a given price of firm e: 
{𝑝𝑎
′ , 𝑠𝑒𝐴} = 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑐𝑎 − 𝑚, 𝑧, 𝑝𝑒𝐴)            (14) 
Where z represents the relative positions of the two firms’ products in the multidimensional product 
space. The above price equations are best response functions in that the price of each firm is that 
which maximises its profit given the price of the other firm.  
There is a Nash equilibrium in the country A market following the entry of firm e (i.e. a ‘subgame 
equilibrium’) where neither firm would want to change its price given the price of the other firm. In 
the following expressions, an asterisk superscript denotes an equilibrium value. 
{𝑝𝑒𝐴
∗ , 𝑠𝑒𝐴
∗ } = 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑐𝑒𝐴, 𝑧, 𝑝𝑎
′∗, 𝑥𝑎
∗ )           (15) 
 {𝑝′𝑎
∗ , 𝑠𝑒𝐴
∗ } = 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑐𝑎 − 𝑚, 𝑧, 𝑝𝑒𝐴
∗ )          (16) 
Given the standard economics of price competition between differentiated products, we can say that 
the closer the products are as substitutes, the more intense price competition between them will be in 
the absence of oligopolistic collusion. Also, if firm e has a significant cost advantage then it will 
capture a large part of the market if the products are close substitutes (low z, low c).  
The value for firm e of internationalising without changing technology, given its choice of trade, FDI, 
or licensing: 
𝑣𝑒𝐴 = 𝑁𝐴𝑠𝑒𝐴
∗ (𝑝𝑒𝐴
∗ − 𝑐𝑒𝐴)           (17) 
 
Firm a to Country E 
The constant marginal cost for the case of firm a internationalising to country E is: 
𝑐𝑎𝐸 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛[𝑐𝑎𝐸
𝑇 , 𝑐𝑎𝐸
𝐹𝐷𝐼 , 𝑐𝑎𝐸
𝐿 ]           (18) 
We can expect the costs of all three modes of internationalisation to be relatively high for an 
advanced-economy firm internationalising to an emerging economy, particularly early on in the 
country’s process of emergence. 
Following the entry of firm a into country E, firm e loses sales in its domestic market and also loses 
further revenue as the competition leads it to reduce its price to 𝑝𝑒
′ . 
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The loss of profits for firm e are: 
𝑞𝑒 = 𝑁𝐸𝑠𝑎𝐸(𝑝𝑒 − 𝑐𝑒) + 𝑁𝐸(1 − 𝑠𝑎𝐸)(𝑝𝑒 − 𝑝𝑒
′ )        (19) 
𝑥𝑒 represents the exit decision of firm e following the incursion into its market.  
𝑥𝑒 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑎𝐸 = 1 if 𝜋𝑒 − 𝑞𝑒 + 𝑀𝑎𝑥[0, 𝑣𝑒𝐴] < 0; 𝑥𝑒 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑎𝐸 < 1 otherwise  (20) 
If firm a offers a superior product at a similar cost then the exit of firm e will be likely. However, it is 
likely that firm a’s product will be both superior and high cost in the country E market (though this 
could change over time). In this case, it would be at the higher end of country E’s market rather than 
being a close substitute. The exit of firm e would then be less likely. 
{𝑝𝑎𝐸 , 𝑠𝑎𝐸} = 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑐𝑎𝐸 , 𝑧, 𝑝𝑒
′ , 𝑥𝑒)         (21) 
{𝑝𝑒
′ , 𝑠𝑎𝐸} = 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑐𝑒 , 𝑧, 𝑝𝑎𝐸)             (22) 
There is a Nash equilibrium in the country E market following the entry of firm a where neither firm 
would want to change its price given the price of the other firm: 
{𝑝𝑎𝐸
∗ , 𝑠𝑎𝐸
∗ } = 𝑝𝑎𝐸(𝑐𝑎𝐸 , 𝑧, 𝑝𝑒
′∗, 𝑥𝑒
∗)          (23) 
{𝑝′𝑒
∗ , 𝑠𝑎𝐸
∗ } = 𝑝𝑒(𝑐𝑒 , 𝑧, 𝑝𝑎𝐸
∗ )           (24) 
The value for firm a of internationalising without changing technology: 
𝑣𝑎𝐸 = 𝑁𝐸𝑠𝑎𝐸
∗ (𝑝𝑎𝐸
∗ − 𝑐𝑎𝐸)         (25) 
 
Overall Equilibrium Conditions (see discussion in sections 3 and 4 of main text) 
1. There is a Nash equilibrium of internationalisation of firm e to country A and with the 
continuation of firm a selling only in its home market if: 
𝑣𝑒𝐴 > 0, 𝑣𝑎𝐸 < 0 and 𝑥𝑎 = 0        (26) 
2. There is a Nash equilibrium of internationalisation from country e to country A and with exit 
of firm a if: 
𝑣𝑒𝐴 > 0 and 𝑥𝑎 = 1         (27) 
3. There is a Nash equilibrium of internationalisation of firm a to country E but with firm e 
continuing to sell only in its home market if: 
𝑣𝑒𝐴 < 0,  𝑣𝑎𝐸 > 0 and 𝑥𝑒 = 0        (28) 
4. There is a Nash equilibrium of internationalisation of firm a to country E and with firm e exit 
if:  
𝑣𝑎𝐸 > 0 and 𝑥𝑒 = 1         (29) 
Bi-Directional Internationalisation 
5. There is a Nash equilibrium of internationalisation of both firms if: 
 𝑣𝑒𝐴 > 0 and 𝑣𝑎𝐸 > 0,         (30) 
so long as both firms e and a are still viable, which is the case if: 
𝜋𝑎 − 𝑞𝑎 + 𝑣𝑎𝐸 ≥ 0 and 𝜋𝑒 − 𝑞𝑒 + 𝑣𝑒𝐴 ≥ 0      (31) 
No internationalisation 
6. There is a Nash equilibrium of no internationalisation if: 
𝑣𝑒𝐴 < 0 and 𝑣𝑎𝐸 < 0         (32) 
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An emerging-market multinational comes into existence in cases 1, 2, and 5 so long as the following 
condition is also met: 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛[𝑐𝑒𝐴
𝑇 , 𝑐𝑒𝐴
𝐿 ] > 𝑐𝑒𝐴
𝐹𝐷𝐼          (33) 
Technology-seeking FDI 
Another way for an EMNE to come into existence, or to widen its foreign-located operations, is 
through technology-seeking FDI. We will now look at a logic for this, based on the incentives for 
internationalisation that have already been considered. Note that it is not necessary for firm e to match 
firm a’s level of technology. Any improvement in it can strengthen its competitive position, provided 
that the gains are not outweighed by the costs. 
Say now that there is a small number of small fringe firms in country A in addition to firm a. Each has 
a very small market share and its own technology. These could be licensed to firm e but assume that 
this is blocked due to weak intellectual property rights in country E so that licensing costs are high. 
Firm e may therefore instead buy one of the fringe firms, assuming that it is available for sale, 
exploiting the economic openness of country A in doing so. Note that, if a greater number of larger 
firms had been assumed then firm e might have been assumed to have had the option of buying one of 
them, again provided it was available for purchase. However, the assumption of small fringe firms is 
made here to tally with the assumption that firms e and a dominate the industry. The purchased fringe 
firm then continues to carry out repetitive R&D in order to keep its technology up to date and, if 
necessary, to make it more suitable for the mass market. The cost of purchasing the fringe firm, net of 
any further value that it has to firm e, is equivalent to an annualised amount P and the recurrent R&D 
costs are an annualised amount re2.  
An alternative is for firm e to set up an R&D operation in country A in order to employ local people 
with advanced skills and knowledge and to access local specialist suppliers. If it does this then it has 
to make an initial investment and then faces recurrent annualised R&D costs in order to keep the 
product up to date. Combined, these are equivalent to an annualised amount of re3. With either 
strategy there is an annualised cost of international technology transfer and also a cost of foreign 
ownership, but the latter should be small in an advanced economy where political risks will normally 
be low. 
If it is assumed that the technological upgrading is equivalent in the two cases, then the purchase of 
the fringe firm will be preferred to setting up a new R&D facility if: 
𝑟𝑒3 > 𝑟𝑒2 + 𝑃           (34) 
Such an investment may then shift the overall equilibrium, as discussed in the main text. 
 
 
